effective 2016 (3) . Although this new standard will help contribute toward cleaner air stemming from fewer emissions, it negatively affects transportation funding under the current gas tax funding system.
In addition, the need for transportation funding has not remained constant. Rather there is a growing need to maintain and improve the existing, aging infrastructure while expanding and enhancing facilities available to motorists. America's infrastructure received an overall rating of D on the 2009 ASCE report card (4) . A variety of solutions have been theorized to help increase revenue available for transportation projects and make travelers more accountable for their use of the infrastructure; solutions range from increasing the gas tax to expanding tollways and increasing the vehicle registration fee.
The gas tax is often viewed as a "second-best" policy, which, although not able to best address any one issue, can simultaneously address multiple issues fairly well (5) . Ideally, vehicles would be charged a user fee that would be assessed on the basis of a variety of variables, such as when and where the vehicle was driven, the impacts of that vehicle on the environment, and the damage being done to the infrastructure. However, this ideal is not currently feasible or efficient on a broad scale, which is one of the reasons that the gas tax exists in lieu of such a system. As vehicle fuel economies continue to increase, motorists will gradually become less accountable for their use of the transportation system. According to McMullen et al., "Until recently fuel taxes were thought to be [a] fairly good proxy for optimal road use fees that charge users based on the damage (or marginal costs) they impose on the road" (6) . However, given increasing vehicle fuel efficiencies and the increasing prevalence of vehicles running on a form of energy other than gasoline, the link between the gas tax and utilization of the infrastructure is weakening. Some of the weaknesses of the current gas tax system, which support the idea that it does not represent the ideal, include the following: it is not sustainable in the long term, increases in the gas tax are often not politically popular, it is associated with a weak ability to promote efficient uses and investment of the infrastructure, it is not closely linked to the externalities caused by different vehicles, it is regressive in nature, and it is sometimes evaded (7) .
In the final report of the National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission, released in February 2009, the commission described several funding options that are available to address growing infrastructure needs. Despite its weaknesses, the commission expressed its opinion that in the short term, increasing the current gas tax is the best option given large installation costs associated with implementing a new transportation fee system. However, the commission also suggested that turning to a fee system based on vehicle miles traveled (VMT) is the best option when one looks past the short-term situation (7) .
Equity Evaluation of Fees for Vehicle Miles Traveled in Texas
Lisa Larsen, Mark Burris, David Pearson, and Patricia Ellis
The Texas state gas tax has been 20 cents per gallon since 1991, and the federal gas tax has been 18.4 cents per gallon since 1993. The gas tax is not only stagnant but also depreciating in value because of inflation. Thus, the money needed to maintain the infrastructure and improve roadways is not being adequately generated. One proposed alternative to the gas tax is the creation of a fee for vehicle miles traveled (VMT), with equity being a crucial issue. This research used Texas data from the 2009 National Household Travel Survey to consider the equity impacts of four VMT-fee scenarios. Data were filtered and weighted to reflect results representative of Texas vehicle-owning households in 2008. Each scenario was run both statically and dynamically under the assumption that the VMT fee would replace the state gas tax. On the basis of quantitative measures, the vertical equity of all proposed VMT-fee scenarios and that of the current state gas tax were similar. In terms of horizontal equity, Scenario 4 was designed to be inherently horizontally equitable: charging different rates for travel on urban roadways and rural roadways corresponding to funding needs associated with that roadway type. Scenario 3, which favored fuel-efficient vehicles, was found to be the least horizontally equitable and caused rural households to contribute the highest percentage of revenue of all scenarios considered. All other scenarios were found to be more horizontally equitable than the current state gas tax.
The Texas state gas tax has been 20 cents per gallon since 1991. The federal gas tax is 18.4 cents per gallon and has not changed since 1993. The gas tax not only is stagnant but is depreciating in value. According to a front-page article in USA Today, although the federal gas tax-18.4 cents/gal-hasn't changed since 1993, tax collections are down because today's vehicles go farther on a gallon of gas, cutting tax collections while increasing wear and tear on highways. Inflation since 1993 has eroded the value of the tax to maintain roads. (1) In this same vein, Cho and Powers state, "The nation's population and number of vehicle miles traveled are increasing, yet the purchasing power of the highway trust fund's fuel tax revenue is decreasing" (2) . The fuel efficiency of new vehicles on America's roadways is only going to improve, in light of President Obama's recently announced new national fuel economy standard of 35.5 mpg for new vehicles
ReseaRch Objective
Given the recent interest in the possibility of a VMT-fee system, research on this topic is timely. There are several issues to consider in the design and eventual implementation of a VMT-fee scenario. One issue concerns who will pay more under the new system and who will pay less and whether the new system will be equitable. Equity is one VMT-fee aspect that should be evaluated and presented to policy makers when they decide which VMT fee, if any, to implement. The impacts on travelers of different VMT-fee scenarios are also important for the public to know. Evaluating the equity of several VMT-fee scenarios was the focus of this research effort.
ReseaRch MethOdOlOgy and scenaRiOs
Texas data from the 2009 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) were used in this research. The NHTS data were filtered and then weighted to reflect all Texas vehicle-owning households in 2008.
Cost estimates were obtained from the Texas 2030 Committee (8) . The committee estimated the allocation of the additional $14.3 billion in annual funding needs: urban roadway needs were $7.8 billion, rural roadway needs were $0.9 billion, and shared needs were $5.6 billion. The VMT fee was then calculated by dividing the appropriate cost plus a proportion of the shared cost by the miles traveled on that roadway type.
All scenarios were based on the concept of keeping the federal gas tax unchanged but replacing the Texas state gas tax with the proposed VMT-fee scenarios for all gasoline-run vehicles included in this analysis. Vehicles not running on gasoline and vehicle types not included in this analysis would continue to be assessed the state gas tax rather than be converted to the proposed VMT fee. Vehicles running on a form of energy other than gasoline made up 1.6% of the unweighted 2009 NHTS Texas vehicles.
Four VMT-fee scenarios were analyzed and compared with the current gas tax funding system by using two different methodologies. First, a static model was considered, which assumed that no change in travel occurred as a result of implementing this new transportation fee. Next, a dynamic model was implemented. The dynamic model reflected changes in travel that were anticipated to stem from changes to the cost of travel. The four scenarios that were analyzed for equity are described next.
scenario 1. Flat vMt Fee
Scenario 1 established a flat per-mile VMT fee that generated a similar amount of net revenue as the amount already collected in Texas through the state gas tax. Although this scenario would not serve to increase the funds currently generated through the state gas tax, it could be used as a tool to familiarize drivers with the concept of a VMT fee.
scenario 2. Flat vMt Fee for added Revenue
Similar to Scenario 1, Scenario 2 established a flat per-mile VMT fee. However, rather than simply generating revenue similar to that currently collected through the Texas state gas tax, Scenario 2 examined the collection of the additional revenue needed to reach the infrastructure and mobility goals established by the 2030 Committee on Texas transportation needs, which totaled an additional $14.3 billion annually (8) . This assessment would be a considerable increase given that Texas state highway fund revenue coming from motor fuel tax allocations in 2008 totaled $2.3 billion (9). scenario 3. three-tier vMt Fee to encourage "green" vehicles Scenario 3 was designed to develop a VMT-fee system that would encourage the use of fuel-efficient vehicles. Initially, vehicles with fuel economy less than the median fuel economy were charged a VMT fee of 2 cents per mile, vehicles with fuel economy between the median value and the mean value were charged a VMT fee of 1.5 cents per mile, and vehicles with fuel economy greater than the mean value were charged a VMT fee of 1 cent per mile. This scenario stems from a scenario implemented in research performed by Zhang and McMullen (10) . When the total revenue generated under this VMT-fee scenario was calculated, the fees assessed to each fuel economy level were then scaled to more accurately meet the projected revenue needed to address Texas's infrastructure and mobility needs, with an additional $14.3 billion of revenue generated annually.
scenario 4. Urban versus Rural distinction
Urban roadways and rural roadways have different costs, characteristics, and travelers. Urban roadways are generally more congested and serve higher volumes of vehicles often taking shorter distance trips. In contrast, rural facilities allow for more direct travel between remote locations, although at times they are infrequently traveled. As suggested by members of the TRB Freight Transportation Economics and Regulation Committee, given these different and distinct functions and costs, it may be more equitable to charge a different rate for urban and rural travel (M. Hornung, unpublished data, TRB Freight Transportation Economics and Regulation Committee, June 25, 2010) . Scenario 4 assessed a different flat VMT fee for travel on urban roadways and for travel on rural roadways. Because information detailing the percentage of urban (or rural) household travel on urban (or rural) roadways was not available, it was necessary to make an educated estimate. On the assumption that, logically, most vehicle miles driven by urban (or rural) households would be on urban (or rural) roadways, the following two vehicle mileage disaggregation scenarios were assumed in the analysis. Research with vehicle Global Positioning System data performed by Ojah (M. Ojah, unpublished data, Texas Transportation Institute, March 4, 2011) helped to confirm that these estimates were reasonable.
• 80/20. It was assumed that 80% of urban household travel was on urban roadways and 20% of urban household travel was on rural roadways. Conversely, 20% of rural household travel was assumed to be on urban roadways and 80% of rural household travel was assumed to be on rural roadways.
• 70/30. It was assumed that 70% of urban household travel was on urban roadways and 30% of urban household travel was on rural roadways. Conversely, 30% of rural household travel was assumed to be on urban roadways, and 70% of rural household travel was assumed to be on rural roadways.
liteRatURe Review vMt-Fee Research
Recently, this issue has received national attention as various plans to help reduce and eventually eliminate the national debt have been proposed. One of the plans, championed by Senators Carper of Delaware and Voinovich of Ohio, proposes incrementally raising the federal gas tax to eventually reach 43.4 cents/gal, which "would generate $200 billion in revenue over five years. Of that, $117 billion would end up earmarked for transfer to the federal Highway Trust Fund" (11) . Similarly, suggestions made in December 2010 by the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform included increasing the gas tax incrementally by 15 cents/gal between 2013 and 2015 (12) . Infrastructure was listed among the important areas in which to invest to "help our economy grow, keep us globally competitive, and make it easier for businesses to create jobs" (12) .
VMT fees are viewed by many as an attractive option to replace the gas tax because of its ability to better hold motorists accountable for their use of the roadway and to foster the collection of funds needed to maintain and improve the infrastructure (6, 7, 10, (13) (14) (15) . Zhang et al. used 2001 NHTS data to consider both the short-term and long-term equity implications of a flat VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile in terms of equity by both household income level and residential locations (15) . The authors state: "The results show that the distributional effects of the VMT fees are small and thus should not be a hindering factor in the future implementation of the proposed VMT fees" (15) . However, they also mention that a flat VMT fee of this nature does not produce any type of incentive to drive more fuel-efficient vehicles and that future research should take fuel efficiency into account through creating a "more sophisticated VMT fee structure" (15) .
Similarly, Zhang and McMullen used 2001 NHTS data to consider two flat VMT fees and two "green" VMT-fee scenarios; each scenario was run both statically and dynamically. The focus of the study was to compare the advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of a static model versus a variety of dynamic models. Given that advantages and disadvantages exist within each model type, trade-offs should be considered in the selection of which model to use in the analysis (10) .
A VMT-fee pilot test involving more than 200 vehicles was conducted in the state of Oregon. The pilot test resulted from the 2001 brainstorming of possible transportation fee ideas by the Oregon Road User Fee Task Force. From the pilot test it was concluded that the implementation of a VMT-fee scenario has potential and would become increasingly feasible as technology improves. Until widespread technology for VMT-fee collection becomes available, unequipped vehicles could continue to be charged the state gas tax (16). Kim et al. evaluated the technology associated with this pilot test and determined that VMT fees could be collected without causing drivers and system operators to spend extra time and effort in reporting and handling these fees (17) .
A large-scale study on mile-based fees is currently being conducted by the University of Iowa Public Policy Center (18) . As part of this road user study, an onboard computer capable of tracking VMT was installed in the vehicles of volunteers in 12 cities across America. The onboard computers were used to monitor motorists' travel for 10 months. Participating vehicles continued to be charged the current gas tax; the VMT fee was purely theoretical and tabulated only for research purposes. The VMT-fee rate varied on the basis of the participants' jurisdiction location and the fuel efficiency. Results of the study are still being compiled and will be presented to the U.S. Department of Transportation.
States along the East Coast of the United States that are part of the I-95 Corridor Coalition have discussed the possibility of establishing a multistate VMT revenue system. As part of an effort to examine legal issues surrounding the coalition, surveys of eight of the entities involved in the coalition (in addition to Oregon, with its vast experience in VMT fees) were administered. Although issues such as revenue collection, system structure (fee, tax, toll), privacy concerns, revenue distribution, rate determination, and multi state agreements were discussed, "None of the responses suggested a state-wide VMT-based system of charges would create insurmountable state constitutional or other legal issues" (19) .
In terms of the equity impacts associated with changing to a VMT fee, Weatherford used 2001 NHTS data to assess the equity impacts related to replacing the federal gas tax with an equivalent flat VMT fee of 98 cents per mile (20) . This type of VMT-fee structure would lead to less of a transportation tax burden on low-income households, rural households, and retired households. He recommended that future VMT-fee scenario structures consider methods to promote the use of fuel-efficient vehicles while maintaining positive equity results for low-income and rural households. Despite shifts in distributional impacts associated with a VMT fee, Weatherford notes that overall changes related to equity are relatively minimal (20) .
vMt-Fee equity
Given that an evaluation of VMT-fee equity is the objective of this research, it is important to define equity and to establish why it is an important issue to consider. According to Oh et al., "The criterion of equity is a measure of the fairness of a pricing scheme to different user groups" (21) . User groups may be defined by household income level, household geographic location, vehicle type classification, or roadway facility type (10, 21) .
The two main types of equity are vertical equity and horizontal equity. According to Litman, "Vertical equity is concerned with the distribution of impacts between individuals and groups that differ in abilities and needs, in this case, by income or social class" (22) . This definition implies that in order for equity to exist, poor or disadvantaged individuals should be charged less than their more wealthy counterparts (22) . In other words, vertical equity suggests the "unequal treatment of unequals" (23) . Two terms often used in describing vertical equity are "regressive" and "progressive." Litman defines them as follows: "Policies favoring disadvantaged groups are called progressive, while those that excessively burden disadvantaged people are called regressive" (22) . Lorenz curves, the Suit index, and Gini coefficients are common methods used to assess vertical equity. In this research, Gini coefficients were selected as the means to evaluate vertical equity, given subtle differences that were not clearly noticeable by using the more graphical methods of the Lorenz curves and the Suit index, although an example of a Lorenz curve is included to help clarify the meaning of the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient can range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating complete income equality and 1 indicating complete income inequality (24) .
In contrast, "[h]orizontal equity is concerned with the distribution of impacts between individuals and groups considered equal in ability and need" (22) . In other words, horizontal equity suggests that "public policies should avoid favoring one individual or group over others" (22) . As described by Toutkoushian and Michael, horizontal equity is the "equal treatment of equals" (23) . Similarly, Taylor and Norton state that "[h]orizontal equity considers how members of the same group (the elderly, bus riders, etc.) fare relative to one another" (25) . Within the current research, Scenario 4 was designed to be inherently horizontally equitable in that the VMT-fee rate charged is linked to the type of roadway being used; thus, funds received are linked to where the captured revenue will be spent to establish improvements.
data nhts data
As previously mentioned, 2009 NHTS Texas data were used in this research. The NHTS is a large-scale, nationwide survey that provides planners and researchers with information relevant to the travel patterns of Americans as well as demographic information that may affect travel (26) . Some form of the NHTS has been administered every 5 to 7 years since 1969 (27); the most recent NHTS was conducted from March 2008 to May 2009 (28) . Previous data collected through the NHTS and its predecessors have been used in the study of a wide range of topics (10, (29) (30) (31) (32) .
The 2009 NHTS survey included over 150,000 households nationwide. Many of these were obtained as part of add-on surveys sponsored by various agencies, often state departments of transportation (28) . As the largest add-on constituent, the Texas Department of Transportation paid for roughly 20,000 additional household surveys to be performed in Texas beyond those already included as part of the national sample (28) . Although additional Texas household surveys were included, no questions beyond those already contained within the national survey were asked of these households. The vehicle file included as part of Version 2.1 of the 2009 NHTS data set (http://nhts.ornl.gov/index.shtml) and the Texas add-on specific data contained all of the add-on data relevant to this research.
Merging data
Some of the variables relevant to this analysis were taken from the Texas add-on vehicle file, and other variables were filtered from the vehicle file of Version 2.1 of the 2009 NHTS data set. It was necessary to merge variables from both data sets. The files were matched based on the unique HOUSEID (household eight-digit ID number) variable.
For the most part, conformity between common variables was realized. However, the coding of some variables was redefined in Version 2.1; this change contributed to some differences in values found between the data sets. Most notably, Version 2.1 of the national data set aggregated VEHYEAR (vehicle model year) for all vehicles built between 1924 and 1984 by simply displaying the year 1974 for all such vehicles. This treatment meant that the current study did not have exact fuel efficiencies for vehicles built before 1985. However, vehicles built before 1985 represented only 2.87% of vehicles and only 0.80% of the total VMT of the vehicles remaining after initial filtering.
Filtering data
The next step was to filter the data; this filtering was performed in two steps. First, initial filtering was done to ensure that the vehicles being considered in the analysis included enough data to allow for the analysis of the four scenarios to be implemented and analyzed. This filtering step left some households with fewer vehicles than the number of vehicles listed under the variable HHVEHCNT (count of household vehicles). These 1,720 households were eliminated. Thus, no vehicles associated with households containing vehicles with incomplete information or irrelevant vehicle types were included in the analysis. The number of households and vehicles remaining after each filtering step are summarized in Table 1 .
One-hundred and thirty-seven of the 29,162 vehicles included in the analysis did not include the variable EIADMPG (EIA derived miles per equivalent-gallon, where EIA is U.S. Energy Information Administration) for fuel economy. To remedy this lack, the average unweighted fuel economy of each vehicle type was calculated on the basis of those vehicles with a provided EIADMPG fuel economy and used to fill in the blanks for vehicles of the same vehicle type. Hybrid vehicles were considered to be their own vehicle type.
weighting data
The next step in preparing the data for analysis was weighting the data. The goal was to develop weights such that the data reflected vehicle-owning Texas households in 2008 disaggregated by the following:
1. Household income level (five classes), 2. Household size (1, 2, 3, 4+), 3. Number of household employees (0, 1, 2+), and 4. Household geographic location (urban, rural). The criteria of household income level, household size, and number of household employees make up a fairly standard weighting approach used in Texas survey data analysis. Further disaggregation by household geographic location was necessary in order to effectively use elasticities needed for the dynamic models, which were disaggregated not only by household income level but also by household geographic location classification. The final weights are shown in Table 2 .
vMt-Fee scenaRiO stRUctURe, analysis, and ResUlts
costs for vMt-Fee system
The transition from the current gas tax transportation funding system to a VMT-fee system would have some initial setup costs. For the purposes of this research, it was assumed that all gasolinerun vehicles being included in this analysis (a weighted total of 15,913,212 vehicles in Texas) would be provided a thin onboard unit (OBU) immediately, at the assumed cost of $195 per unit (33) . This would equate to a total of $3,103,076,340 spent on OBUs. Likewise, it was assumed that 16,000 service stations in Texas would be equipped to process VMT fees. This service station estimate was based on an estimate of 16,500 service stations in Texas as of 2006 (34) and the fact that 16,000 service stations belong to the Texas Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store Association, which "own, operate, or supply approximately 16,000 convenience stores, service stations, and other retail motor fuel outlets in Texas and the southwest United States" (35) . The estimated cost was $15,000 per station (36) ; this cost would equate to $240,000,000 for service station equipment. Note: Several households did not meet multiple criteria. Numbers associated with each criterion were calculated under the assumption that each was independent. Generally, −1 = appropriate skip; −7 = refused; −8 = don't know; −9 = not ascertained. a 100% of household members completed survey. Given that the time frame of this analysis was from 2009 to 2030, in an attempt to meet the needs described by the Texas transportation needs commission by 2030, the implementation costs were spread out over the 22-year time period under consideration, which was assumed to be the life span of the thin OBUs . A coupon rate of 4.5% was assumed based on the recent state of Texas bond sales. Even after the initial implementation costs, there would be yearly operating costs associated with a VMT-fee system and the cost of new OBUs and new service stations to outfit. The 2005 National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Committee report states: "The aim should be for the total annual net cost of operation to be less than 10% of the total revenue collected within a few years of implementation and less than 5% in the longer term" (7). This analysis assumed an operating cost of 10% of the gross generated revenue rather than the 10% net operating cost suggested in the report, which seems conservative.
In addition to implementation costs and operating costs, it is assumed that some individuals will try to evade the system. A widescale VMT-fee system has not yet been implemented in the United States; therefore, it is difficult to estimate what percentage of drivers would cheat the system (the amount of "leakage"). Smaller-scale pilot tests-such as those performed in Oregon-are not a good source for estimating this leakage because individuals knowingly participating in such a closely monitored testing situation likely behave differently from the general public. Given this lack of a dependable estimate, it was assumed that the leakage under a VMT-fee system may be comparable with the percentage of high-occupancy vehicle lane violators. Therefore, the leakage was estimated to be 10% for this analysis; this percentage is within the estimated range of violators of high-occupancy vehicle lanes nationwide (37) .
elasticities
In order to estimate the change in driver behavior due to the new VMT fee for the dynamic scenarios, it was necessary to determine reasonable elasticities. Elasticity is defined as "the percentage change in consumption of a good caused by a one-percent change in its price or other characteristics (such as traffic speed or road capacity)" (38) . In cases where VMT-fee scenarios have actually been implemented, it would be possible to directly calculate the elasticity associated with a given scenario. However, for VMT-fee research still in the theoretical stage, researchers often rely on the elasticities obtained from previous studies of a similar nature.
Elasticity in terms of VMT and the associated price of gas, VMT fees, or both, is elasticity change in VMT change in total cost of = % % g gas and/or VMT fee VMT VMT VMT where VMT 1 = original VMT, VMT 2 = new VMT, P 1 = original price of gas, and P 2 = new price of gas (no state tax) plus VMT fee.
Gasoline price elasticities are assumed to be similar to VMT-fee scenario elasticities. Wadud et al. provide gasoline price elasticities disaggregated by both household income quintile and household geographic location, which were used as constraints in calculating the price elasticities shown in Table 3 (39) . The elasticities are based on the percent change in the total price of gas, and not just the change in the state gas tax portion of the price. An illustrative example of how elasticities were applied in this analysis with Equation 1 is as follows: elasticity i.e., a 1% increase in the price of = 0 3 . g gas will result in a decrease in VMT of 0.3% where P 2 = P gas − P stategastax + VMT fee; P gas = price of gas; P stategastax = price of state gas tax, which is 20 cents per gallon; and VMT fee = 23 cents per gallon.
The resulting decrease of 0.3% in VMT caused by a 1% increase in the price of gas would result in a VMT 2 of 997 mi.
These elasticities were used in calculating the anticipated change in annual VMT for households within each subcategory of the three-way cross-classification matrices. The process was somewhat iterative because vehicles within each household were anticipated to be driven less with an increase in the transportation fee associated with their travel. This decrease meant that the initial revenue estimate based on initial VMT would decrease and thus make it necessary to increase the transportation fee needed to secure the desired revenue total in spite of changes in travel patterns.
ResUlts and discUssiOn
A summary of the resulting VMT fees for each VMT-fee scenario is provided in Table 4 .
gini coefficients and vertical equity
The Gini coefficient (G) was calculated for each scenario and compared relative to the state gas tax to determine whether it was quantitatively more or less vertically equitable than the current state gas tax system (see Table 5 ). It may initially seem counterintuitive that Scenario 3, which assesses a higher fee on vehicles with poor fuel economy, is the scenario under which low-income households pay the smallest percentage of the revenue generated by either the state gas tax or the VMT fee. However, the weighted average fuel economy (linked to how much each vehicle is driven) is very similar for all income levels (ranging from 21.1 mpg for the lowest household income quintile to 21.5 mpg for the highest household income quintile). The fact that low-income households contribute a smaller percentage of the generated revenue under Scenario 3 despite their slightly lower average weighted vehicle fuel economy is linked to the way Scenario 3 is structured. The VMT fees assessed are discrete, with the amount charged based on how a vehicle's fuel economy compares with the calculated median and mean fuel economy used in this analysis. Even though the weighted average fuel economies are similar for all household income quintiles, the weighted average does not take into account the range of the weighted vehicle fuel economies. A comparison of the Gini coefficient for Scenario 3 and the state gas tax indicates that on the basis of the VMT-fee categories assumed for Scenario 3, high-income households drive more miles in vehicles that fall into the VMT-fee categories that are assessed either the high or medium rate than their less wealthy counterparts do. Although differences exist, they are minor and indicate that essentially all of the VMT-fee scenarios are as vertically equitable as the state gas tax. The visual result-shown as a Lorenz curve-is provided in Figure 1 (this Lorenz curve is for the Texas state gas tax in 2008 but it would look similar for all scenarios). The weighted average annual VMT-fee revenue per vehicle-owning household rounded to the nearest dollar and the percent increase in average annual amount assessed per household in the form of a VMT fee are shown in Table 6 versus the state gas tax for the dynamic models (similar results were obtained for the static models).
Although the scenario with the largest Gini coefficient is described as being the most progressive scenario, it is important to realize that this statement is in terms of relative tax burden. In other words, the scenario termed most progressive in Table 5 refers to the scenario in which low-income households pay a smaller percentage of the state gas tax or VMT fees when compared with the other scenarios. In absolute terms, when burden as a percentage of total household income is considered, all scenarios are regressive.
With Figure 1 as an example, the "equity" line is where 20% of the population with the lowest income pays 20% of the taxes; the next-richest 20% of the population pays another 20% of the taxes, and so on until 100% of the population pays 100% of the taxes. Moreprogressive taxing schemes (like the Lorenz curve in Figure 1 ) require the lower-income groups to pay a smaller percentage of the taxes. For example, in Figure 1 , the poorest 20% of the population pays just over 10% of the taxes. The Gini coefficient is a measure of the difference between these two curves. From Figure 1 , the Gini coefficient is the area A divided by the area A + B. Therefore, as area A grows, the Gini coefficient increases, indicating a more progressive tax in which low-income groups pay a smaller portion of the tax.
horizontal equity
Scenario 4 was designed to inherently achieve horizontal equity because all vehicles, regardless of which type of household they belong to, pay the designated fees unique to urban roadways and rural roadways. In turn, the revenue from each roadway fee goes back to improving the mobility and infrastructure of that area type with the revenue amount dictated by the disaggregation of roadway type needs (urban, rural, or shared roadway). Thus, this type of design is one form of the "equal treatment of equals" (23) . Scenario 4 was used as a benchmark in quantitatively assessing the relative horizontal equity of each scenario. The more a scenario's urban household or rural household revenue collection distribution varied from Scenario 4, the less horizontally equitable it was determined to be. The horizontal equity results corresponding to the static models are shown in Table 7 (similar results were found for dynamic models). Scenario 3 was found to be less horizontally equitable than the current state gas tax for both the static and dynamic models. 
cOnclUsiOns
The 2009 NHTS Texas data provided a large, detailed data set that contributed to the success and detail of this research effort. The VMTfee scenarios analyzed as part of this research illustrate the varying equity impacts that can be achieved under different philosophies governing VMT-fee design. When vertical equity was considered through the use of Gini coefficients, it was determined that all VMTfee scenarios considered in this analysis were essentially as vertically equitable as the current state gas tax. In terms of horizontal equity, all other scenarios (including the current state gas tax) were compared relative to Scenario 4, which was designed to be inherently horizontally equitable for urban versus rural households. Scenario 3, a scenario that favored vehicles with high fuel efficiency, was found to be the least horizontally equitable but not by much more than the current state gas tax. Most VMT-fee scenarios were more horizontally equitable than the current state gas tax. The equity results are presented in the hope that they will be used as a tool by policy makers in evaluating the impact each scenario would have on their constituents. Future studies may consider the inclusion of vehicles running on forms of energy other than gasoline, the development of elasticities based on household characteristics, and the development of additional variations of VMT-fee design. Additional research may also investigate how to better disaggregate between costs and revenues of urban and rural areas as well as between costs and revenues of heavy commercial vehicles and personal vehicles. As advances in technology continue to progress, it will become increasingly feasible and less costly to implement a VMT-fee scenario that could hold motorists more accountable for their use of the infrastructure in place of the current state gas tax. Note: na = not applicable.
acknOwledgMents

